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Attention selects stimuli for perceptual and cognitive processing according to an adaptive
selection schedule. It has long been known that attention selects stimuli that are task
relevant or perceptually salient. Recent evidence has shown that stimuli previously
associated with reward persistently capture attention involuntarily, even when they are
no longer associated with reward. Here we examine whether the capture of attention
by previously reward-associated stimuli is modulated by the processing of current but
unrelated rewards. Participants learned to associate two color stimuli with different
amounts of reward during a training phase. In a subsequent test phase, these previously
rewarded color stimuli were occasionally presented as to-be-ignored distractors while
participants performed visual search for each of two differentially rewarded shape-defined
targets. The results reveal that attentional capture by formerly rewarded distractors was
the largest when both recently received and currently expected reward were the highest
in the test phase, even though such rewards were unrelated to the color distractors.
Our findings support a model in which value-driven attentional biases acquired through
reward learning are maintained via the cognitive mechanisms involved in predicting future
rewards.
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INTRODUCTION
Perception is limited in its representational capacity, which gives
rise to the need to perceive stimuli selectively. Selective attention
controls the availability of stimuli for cognition, decision mak-
ing, and action (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). Recent evidence
reviewed below suggests that attentional priority is influenced by
prior associations between stimuli and reward, as well as by the
current reward value of stimuli. By attending to stimuli associated
with the delivery of reward (e.g., nutrients), organisms maximize
the opportunity to procure valuable resources that are critical to
their survival and wellbeing.
The voluntary deployment of attention can be influenced by
the reward value of stimuli. For example, visual search is more
efficient for targets associated with the delivery of reward (e.g.,
Kiss et al., 2009; Kristjansson et al., 2010). Targets associated with
high reward are also more robustly represented in early visual
areas of the brain (Serences, 2008; Serences and Saproo, 2010).
Certain stimuli capture attention involuntarily, including
physically salient stimuli (e.g., Yantis and Jonides, 1984;
Theeuwes, 1992, 2010) and stimuli possessing goal-related fea-
tures (e.g., Folk et al., 1992; Anderson and Folk, 2012). Recent
evidence demonstrates that attention is also captured by pre-
viously rewarding stimuli. The recent delivery of high reward
primes attention to a reward-associated stimulus (Hickey et al.,
2010, 2011). Furthermore, we have shown that stimuli persis-
tently capture attention after repeated pairings with reward, even
when they are no longer rewarded and are otherwise inconspic-
uous and task-irrelevant (Anderson et al., 2011b; Anderson and
Yantis, 2012, 2013).
Over the past two decades, much has been learned about the
underlying neurobiology of reward. Learned reward predictions
are represented in the basal ganglia (BG), such that the onset of
reward-associated stimuli elicits the release of dopamine (DA)
from BG neurons (Schultz et al., 1997; Waelti et al., 2001). It is
also known that unexpected reward also elicits phasic DA release.
Once an organism learns that a stimulus predicts reward, the
receipt of the expected reward no longer produces DA release
in response to the reward; instead, the omission of the expected
reward depresses DA activity (Schultz et al., 1997). Thus, pha-
sic DA activity is thought to convey a signal that represents both
reward prediction and reward-prediction error.
The relationship between the underlying mechanisms for pro-
cessing reward and for biasing attention in favor of reward-
associated stimuli is unknown. One possibility is that reward
motivates the recruitment of different cognitive processes, such
as memory storage and perceptual learning, in order to establish
and maintain attentional biases that prove adaptive in promoting
reward procurement. By such an account, value-driven atten-
tional biases are maintained independently of the cognitive archi-
tecture that subserves reward processing. Another possibility is
that value-driven attentional priority is represented and signaled
by the reward processing system, which is sensitive to current
reward predictions. In the present study, we adjudicate between
these two accounts by measuring the magnitude of attentional
capture by previously reward-associated stimuli when different
levels of reward were predicted from the current task.
The experiment was modeled after the experiments of
Anderson et al. (2011b) and included a training phase and a test
phase. In the training phase, participants learned to associate each
of two color stimuli with different amounts of monetary reward
(see Figure 1A). The training phase was followed by a test phase
that was a modified version of the additional singleton paradigm
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. Sequence of events and time course for a trial during the training phase (A) and test phase (B). Each trial was followed
by a blank 1000ms intertrial interval.
(Theeuwes, 1992) in which the target of visual search was a shape
singleton (see Figure 1B). Reward feedback was also provided in
the test phase, and one of the shape targets (e.g., a unique cir-
cle among diamonds) was probabilistically associated with more
reward than the other. This reward structure allowed participants
to experience reward prediction and reward-prediction error on
each trial. Each item in the test phase was rendered in a differ-
ent color, but color was not relevant to the task. However, one
of the non-targets was sometimes rendered in a color that was
associated with reward during the preceding training phase. This
design allowed us to assess the magnitude of value-driven atten-
tional capture by previously rewarded colors in the test phase,
as a function of both reward prediction and reward-prediction
error. The hypothesis that value-driven attentional priority is rep-
resented and signaled by the reward processing system predicts
that value-driven attentional capture should be maximal when
these reward signals are the largest, even though current rewards
are unrelated to the previously reward-associated stimuli.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen participants were recruited from the Johns Hopkins
University community. All were screened for normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity and color vision. Participants were pro-
vided monetary compensation based on performance that varied
between 12 and $15 (mean = $13.44). All procedures were
approved by the Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review
Board and all participants provided informed consent.
APPARATUS
A Mac Mini equipped with Matlab software and Psychophysics
Toolbox extensions was used to present the stimuli on a Dell P991
monitor. The participants viewed the monitor from a distance of
approximately 50 cm in a dimly lit room. Manual responses were
entered using a 101-key US layout keyboard.
STIMULI
Each trial consisted of a fixation display, a search array, and a feed-
back display (see Figure 1). The fixation display contained a white
fixation cross (0.5 × 0.5◦ visual angle) presented in the center of
the screen against a black background, and the search array con-
sisted of the fixation cross surrounded by six shape stimuli (each
with a diameter of 2.3◦ visual angle) placed at equal intervals on
an imaginary circle with a radius of 5◦. The six shapes were each
rendered in a different color (red, green, blue, cyan, pink, orange,
yellow, or white).
During the training phase, all six of the shapes were circles and
the target was defined as the red or green circle (exactly one of
which was presented on each trial). During the test phase, the
six shapes consisted of either a diamond among circles or a cir-
cle among diamonds, and the target was defined as the unique
shape. On 25% of the trials in the test phase, one of the non-
target shapes was red and on another 25% of the trials, one of
the non-target shapes was green; these constituted the formerly
rewarded distractors (these two non-target shapes are referred to
as “distractors”). The target was never red or green during the test
phase.
Inside the target shape, a white line segment was oriented
either vertically or horizontally, and inside each of the non-
targets, a white line segment was tilted at 45◦ to the left or
to the right (randomly for each non-target). The participant
was required to report whether the orientation of the line seg-
ment inside the target shape was vertical or horizontal with a
corresponding key press. Correct responses were followed in both
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phases of the experiment by a feedback display that informed par-
ticipants of the monetary reward earned on that trial, as well as
the total reward accumulated thus far in the experiment.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The experiment consisted of 240 trials during each of the two
phases, for a total of 480 trials. Participants completed 50 practice
trials prior to the training phase, and 20 practice (distractor-
absent) trials prior to the test phase; behavioral data from these
practice trials were not included in any analysis. In the training
phase, target identity and target location were fully crossed and
counterbalanced, and trials were presented in a random order. In
the test phase, target identity, target location, distractor identity,
and distractor location were fully crossed and counterbalanced,
and trials were presented in a random order. Thus, in the test
phase, the presence and identity of the distractor provided no
predictive information concerning the target or reward.
In both the training and test phase, one of the two targets
(e.g., red during training and diamond singleton at test) was fol-
lowed by a high reward on 80% of correct trials and a low reward
on the remaining 20%; the percentages were reversed for the
low-reward target. High and low rewards were 6 and 2¢, respec-
tively, during the training phase and 3 and 1¢ during the test
phase (higher rewards were used in the training phase to max-
imize the learning of the color–reward associations). Incorrect
responses or responses that were too slow were followed by feed-
back indicating 0¢ had been earned. Which color target and
shape-singleton target was associated with high reward in their
respective phase of the experiment was counterbalanced across
participants, such that each combination of color and shape was
used equally often. Participants were not informed of the reward
contingencies, which had to be learned through experience in the
task. Upon completion of the experiment, participants were given
the cumulative reward they had earned.
Each trial began with the presentation of the fixation display
for a randomly varying interval of 400, 500, or 600ms. The search
array then appeared and remained on screen until a response was
made or the trial timed out. Trials timed out after 800ms in the
training phase and 1200ms in the test phase. The search array
was followed by a blank screen for 1000ms, the reward feedback
display for 1500ms, and a 1000ms intertrial interval.
Participants made a forced-choice target identification by
pressing the “z” and the “m” keys for the vertically- and
horizontally-orientated targets, respectively. If the trial timed out,
the computer emitted a 500ms and 1000Hz feedback tone.
DATA ANALYSIS
Only correct responses were included in all analyses of RT, and all
RTs more than three standard deviations above or below themean
of their respective condition for each participant were excluded.
RESULTS
TRAINING PHASE
There were no significant differences in RT [t(15) = −0.16,
p = 0.877] or accuracy [t(15) = −1.04, p = 0.316] to report a
high-reward target compared to a low-reward target (means for
high-reward target: 537ms, 90.0%; means for low-reward target:
536ms, 91.1%). There were also no significant differences in RT
[t(15) = 1.81, p = 0.091] or accuracy [t(15) = −1.14, p = 0.272]
based on the color of the target (means for red: 534ms, 91.2%;
means for green: 539ms, 89.9%). In our prior studies on reward
and attention, participants have generally been faster to respond
to high-reward targets than to low-reward targets (Anderson
et al., 2011a, 2012; Anderson and Yantis, 2012). The present
results suggest that top–down attentional control dominated per-
formance in the training phase, such that participants searched
for the two target colors with approximately equal priority. The
reward feedback allowed participants to learn the color–reward
contingencies, however, and the effects of these contingencies on
performance in the test phase were of primary interest.
TEST PHASE
We first compared RT and accuracy for trials containing a high-
reward target compared to a low-reward target, as in the training
phase. As in the training phase, RT [t(15) = −0.28, p = 0.785]
and accuracy [t(15) = −0.26, p = 0.798] did not differ based on
the value of the target (means for high-reward target: 673ms,
89.8%; means for low-reward target: 663ms, 90.6%). There was
a highly significant effect of target shape, such that participants
were substantially faster and more accurate to report circle-
singleton targets compared to diamond-singleton targets [for RT:
mean difference = 130ms, t(15) = 14.26, p < 0.001, d = 3.57; for
accuracy: mean difference = 8.9%, t(15) = 4.59, p < 0.001, d =
1.15]. This suggests that the circle singleton was more physically
salient than the diamond singleton.
Next, to assess the effect of distractor presence, trials during
the test phase were sorted according to whether they contained
a non-target formerly associated with high reward (high-value
distractor, 25% of trials), a non-target formerly associated with
low reward (low-value distractor, 25% of trials), or neither (50%
of trials). A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that RT in
the three distractor conditions differed significantly [Table 1,
F(2, 30) = 16.63, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.526]. Neither the color that
was associated with high reward during training [F(2, 24) = 2.93,
p = 0.073] nor the shape singleton that was associated with high
reward at test (F < 1) interacted significantly with the effect of
distractor condition on RT, and the three-way interaction was
also not significant [F(2, 24) = 1.08, p = 0.357], so we collapsed
across these two factors. A post-hoc contrast revealed that RT was
slower when a previously rewarded color distractor was present
compared to the distractor-absent condition, indicating the pres-
ence of value-driven attentional capture by formerly rewarded
but now irrelevant colors [t(15) = 5.72, p < 0.001, d = 1.72]; RT
did not differ between the high- and low-value distractor con-
ditions [t(15) = −0.63, p = 0.537], and the distractors captured
Table 1 | Response time and accuracy by condition in the test phase.
Distractor condition
Absent Low-value High-value
Response time (ms) 652 677 674
Accuracy 89.4% 91.1% 90.0%
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attention regardless of their color [both t’s > 4.50, p’s < 0.001].
Accuracy did not differ significantly among the three conditions
(F < 1), nor did the effect of distractor condition on accuracy
interact with the color associated with high-reward during train-
ing [F(2, 24) = 2.03, p = 0.153] or the shape singleton associated
with high-reward at test (F < 1), and the three-way interaction
was also not significant (F < 1).
According to reward-prediction error accounts, a represen-
tation of current expected reward develops based on a trial’s
former context (e.g., Nakahara et al., 2004). We therefore next
examined how the magnitude of predicted reward on a given
trial (based on the target’s shape) modulated the degree to
which the formerly rewarded color distractors captured atten-
tion. The predicted reward on a given trial was defined as the
mean reward received over the previous five trials in which the
current shape-singleton target served as the target. This com-
puted value was used rather than the actual reward probabilities
assigned to the singleton target, as previous research has shown
that participants are highly sensitive to recent reward history
(e.g., Serences, 2008), and this method better accounts for tri-
als in the early part of the test phase in which participants have
had little experience with the current reward contingencies. The
mean reward received in the last 5 trials is, of course, highly
correlated with the actual reward probabilities. But estimated
value can vary considerably given the stochastic fluctuations in
actual reward delivery, and so this method provides a poten-
tially more sensitive index of the influence of experienced value
on performance. We calculated value-driven attentional capture
(slowing of RT on distractor present vs. absent trials) sepa-
rately for trials on which the current shape singleton’s predicted
reward fell into one of four equally-spaced ranges as shown in
Figure 2A. Themagnitude of value-driven capture differed signif-
icantly for different amounts of predicted reward [F(3, 45) = 2.96,
p = 0.042, η2p = 0.165], and the data were well accounted for
by a linear trend in which the magnitude of capture becomes
greater as predicted reward increases [F(1, 15) = 6.97, p = 0.019,
η2p = 0.317].
RT on distractor-absent trials did not differ based on predicted
reward (F < 1), meaning that the observed changes in the magni-
tude of value-driven attentional capture as a function of predicted
reward were not the consequence of baseline shifts in RT (the
mean RTs on distractor-absent trials as a function of increasingly
high predicted reward were 652, 646, 640, and 664ms). Neither
did themagnitude of value-driven attentional capture differ based
on the mean reward received over the previous 5 trials without
respect to the current target (F < 1), meaning that the effect of
predicted reward on attentional capture did not reflect a more
global consequence of recently received rewards.
In addition to the mean reward received over the last few trials
a given stimulus was a target, another potentially salient reward-
related signal concerns recent reward-prediction error. Positive
reward-prediction error occurs when more reward is received
than predicted, and negative reward-prediction error when less
reward is received than expected. Reward-prediction errors are
thought to provide a teaching signal that adjusts subsequent
reward predictions to reduce the discrepancy between previ-
ously predicted and received reward (e.g., Waelti et al., 2001).
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results. (A) Value-driven attentional capture
(defined as the mean difference in RT between distractor-present and
distractor-absent trials) as a function of the value of the search context
(defined as the mean reward obtained on the previous 5 trials in which the
current shape singleton served as the target). (B) Value-driven attentional
capture as a function of the reward-prediction error experienced on the
previous trial. The error bars reflect the within-subjects SEM.
Therefore, the representation of reward on a given trial can be
expressed in terms of the reward-prediction error realized on
the preceding trial, with the magnitude being larger following
positive reward-prediction error and smaller following negative
reward-prediction error.
A positive reward-prediction error was taken to occur when
participants received a high reward following a singleton tar-
get that typically yields low reward, and a negative reward-
prediction error was taken to occur when participants received a
low reward following a singleton target that usually yields high
reward. We found that the magnitude of value-driven atten-
tional capture differed significantly following the three possible
outcomes of reward prediction on the previous trial (positive
prediction error, negative prediction error, and no prediction
error) [Figure 2B, F(2, 30) = 4.63, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.236]. In
particular, value-driven capture was significantly greater follow-
ing a positive reward-prediction error than following a negative
reward-prediction error [t(15) = 2.63, p = 0.019, d = 0.66]; the
former produced substantial value-driven attentional capture,
while the latter produced no evidence of attentional capture. RT
on distractor-absent trials did not differ based on the reward-
prediction error on the preceding trial (F < 1), meaning that the
observed changes in the magnitude of value-driven attentional
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capture were not the consequence of baseline shifts in RT (the
mean RTs on distractor-absent trials following negative, no, and
positive reward-prediction error were 658, 653, and 641ms,
respectively). This provides further evidence that the attentional
bias toward stimuli with learned value varies as a function of
ongoing task-related reward processing.
DISCUSSION
Attention selects stimuli for perceptual and cognitive process-
ing. By attending to stimuli associated with the delivery of
reward, organisms maximize the opportunity to procure valuable
resources. We have previously shown that valuable stimuli capture
attention involuntarily (Anderson et al., 2011a,b, 2012; Anderson
and Yantis, 2012, 2013). The present study tested the hypothesis
that this attentional bias for valuable stimuli is maintained via the
cognitive mechanisms involved in processing rewards.
Using two different measures of ongoing reward processing,
we found strong influences of both currently expected reward
and recent reward-prediction error on the magnitude of value-
driven attentional capture by formerly rewarded distractors. The
greater the reward prediction on a given trial, the greater the dis-
traction caused by previously rewarded but currently irrelevant
stimuli. This finding is surprising because one might hypoth-
esize participants to be most resistant to distraction when a
high reward target was available to motivate goal-directed per-
formance. Value-driven attentional capture was also more pro-
nounced following positive reward-prediction error (i.e., when
more reward was received than expected) than following negative
reward-prediction error. This finding is also somewhat surpris-
ing because one might hypothesize that the reward-prediction
errors would increase attention to the target, rather than to the
distractor. Instead, this result shows that when an unexpectedly
high reward has been obtained, stimuli that predict high reward
in both the current and past contexts tend to capture attention.
Interestingly, value-driven attentional capture was small or
non-existent when predicted reward was low and recent reward-
prediction error was negative, respectively. This contrasts with the
magnitude of value-driven attentional capture typically observed
without reward feedback during the test phase (e.g., Anderson
et al., 2011a,b; Anderson and Yantis, 2012, 2013). This suggests
that relatively small rewards are experienced as disappointing and
result in a reduction in the attentional bias afforded to reward-
associated stimuli, consistent with the small or even negative
priming observed following a low reward (e.g., Della Libera and
Chelazzi, 2006; Hickey et al., 2010, 2011).
These behavioral results suggest the existence of a common
mechanism that represents both reward predictions and reward-
prediction error, and signals incentive salience (i.e., attentional
priority for formerly rewarded stimuli). One candidate for this
mechanism is the phasic DA signal in the BG (Schultz et al., 1997;
Waelti et al., 2001). This is consistent with recent evidence show-
ing that the visual representation of a reward-associated cue is
modulated by the receipt of unrelated reward and corresponding
reward-related DA activity (Arsenault et al., 2013). If value-
based attentional priority is signaled via mechanisms that overlap
with the signaling of current reward, modulating the representa-
tion of current reward should produce concurrent modulations
in value-driven attentional capture. By relating ongoing reward
processing to value-driven attentional capture in this way, our
findings provide further insight into the mechanisms underlying
attentional capture by reward-associated stimuli, which, in turn,
has important implications for theories linking reward learning
to attentional control (e.g., Della Libera and Chelazzi, 2006, 2009;
Serences, 2008; Peck et al., 2009; Raymond and O’Brien, 2009;
Hickey et al., 2010, 2011; Krebs et al., 2010; Serences and Saproo,
2010; Anderson et al., 2011a,b, 2012; Della Libera et al., 2011;
Anderson and Yantis, 2012, 2013; Hickey and van Zoest, 2012).
It is worth noting that in the present study, the magnitude of
attentional capture by stimuli previously associated with reward
did not depend on the magnitude of prior reward value experi-
enced during training (i.e., RT did not differ between the high-
and low-value distractor conditions). One possibility is that the
reward associated with the color distractors was influenced by the
reward received in the test phase, which was unrelated to color.
Both color targets were associated with reward outcome in the
training phase of present study, and the extent to which persis-
tent reward-related attentional biases acquired through learning
should scale with the magnitude of prior reward is unclear.
Previous studies show that reward associations play a direct and
important role in the development of attentional biases for for-
mer targets (Anderson et al., 2011a,b, 2012; Anderson and Yantis,
2013), which, together with the observed influence of ongoing
rewards, suggests that the observed attentional biases for former
targets reflects an effect of reward history.
Our findings also provide further evidence for a mode of
attentional control that is distinct from the well-documented
stimulus-driven and goal-directed mechanisms (e.g., Folk et al.,
1992; Theeuwes, 1992, 2010; Yantis, 2000; Connor et al., 2004).
We show that previously reward-predictive but currently irrel-
evant stimuli capture attention even when they are not task
relevant and not physically salient, replicating previous results
(Anderson et al., 2011b; Anderson and Yantis, 2012, 2013). Our
data also reveal that motivating current task goals with reward
potentiates rather than minimizes attentional capture by previ-
ously valuable but currently irrelevant stimuli. If value-driven
attentional capture merely reflected difficulty overcoming a previ-
ously motivated selection strategy, it would not be expected to be
modulated in this way and might instead be better overcome by
the motivation provided by currently expected reward. Thus, our
results provide direct evidence that learned value influences atten-
tional control in a way that does not depend on either physical
salience or ongoing goals, and is instead mediated by the cognitive
mechanisms involved in reward processing.
Attentional biasing of reward-associated stimuli is adaptive
in many circumstances, facilitating the procurement of future
rewards. However, previous reward learning and ongoing goals
will at times conflict, as they do, for example, in the case of
desired abstinence from a substance of abuse. Visual cues for a
substance of abuse can involuntary capture attention in drug-
dependent populations (e.g., Lubman et al., 2000; Marissen et al.,
2006; Field and Cox, 2008), much as the previously reward-
associated distractors capture attention in the present study. This
drug-related attentional bias is thought to play an important
role in contributing to relapse following periods of abstinence
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(see Field and Cox, 2008, for a review). Our findings have impli-
cations for theories of such disordered attentional control in
addiction by demonstrating that reward-related attentional biases
are mediated specifically by the brain mechanisms involved in
processing rewards, which are known to be directly affected by
drugs of abuse (e.g., Berridge and Robinson, 1998).
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